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1. Introduction
For centuries, we have witnessed the development of space 
technologies and increasingly ambitious space exploration 
programs. What has changed lately is the fact that this devel-
opment is no longer the domain of only of traditionally strong 
actors – the largest and wealthiest nation-states (e.g. USA, 
Russia, Japan, China) or international organizations like Eu-
ropean Space Agency. Nowadays, we observe an accelerat-
ing growth of space technologies (e.g., reusability of rocket 
boosters, new rockets under testing and development, includ-
ing SpaceX’s Falcon Heavy and Starship, NASA’s SLS, Blue 
Origin’s New Shepard) that translates into a growing number 
of yearly orbital launches (52 orbital launches in 2005, 70 
– in 2010, 114 – in 2018, and planned 173 for 2019) (Kyle, 
2019a; Kyle 2019b). Currently, the entire space sector is esti-
mated at $ 350 trillion, and according to the Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch, the space industry will be worth least $2.7 trillion 
over the next three decades (Sheetz, 2017).
From the perspective of the history of technology, we are at 
the beginning of a new technological revolution that will provide 
the humankind the tools to go beyond the Earth and expand the 
living environment of people by Earth’s orbit (including space 
tourism), the Moon (planned permanent base), or finally Mars, 
which colonization, according to Elon Musk – the creator and 
head engineer of SpaceX, should start over the next few years.
In addition to the above expansion plans, we also observe 
another interesting phenomenon related to the development 
of the space sector, namely the democratization of technology 
that so far has been reserved for the most powerful actors. 
Nowadays, also relatively small countries, like Israel or Nor-
way, achieve successes in the space industry.
The changes briefly described above are a background for 
the military usage of outer space. We are witnesses, today, 
of a paradigm change, which stems from a rapid increase of 
the strategic importance of outer space, Earth orbits in par-
ticular. This increase in significance unambiguously translates 
into a growth in investments in defensive systems securing 
satellites.
At this point, it has to be mentioned that there are var-
ious understandings of what militarization of outer space 
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is. Many believe, like Bruce DeBlois, of the United States 
Council on Foreign Relations, that there is a clear distinc-
tion between weaponization of space, i.e., deployment of 
weapons in space, and militarization – “force enhancement 
including communications, navigational and intelligence 
gathering activity” (UNIDIR, 2003, p. 3). On the other hand, 
the term “space weapon” is difficult to define because almost 
everything can be used as a weapon in space, e.g., a satel-
lite, in operation or not, can be put on a colliding trajectory 
and destroy or seriously damage any orbiting object (White, 
2017). Moreover, it is believed that approximately 95% of 
satellites have both military and civilian purposes, with the 
orbital navigation systems like American GPS or Russian 
GLONASS serving as a primary example (Bartels, 2018). 
Although this distinction has its ground and under particu-
lar circumstances is valid – there is a real difference between, 
e.g., using orbital systems to secure military communication 
and actual deployment of weapon systems on the orbit with 
the capacity to destroy targets either in space or on the Earth 
– it is not relevant for a general analysis carried out in this pa-
per. When discussing militarization of outer space, I will refer 
to the placement and development of weaponry and military 
technology, i.e., such that can be used for military purposes, 
in the Earth orbit, and deep space, including ballistic missiles 
and hypersonic gliders that pass through outer space during 
their flight.
2.  Militarization of Outer Space and the International 
Legal Solutions Currently in Force 
The most important document regulating the use of outer 
space is the so-called The Outer Space Treaty (formally 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) (UNOSA, 1967) that has 
been ratified by 109 countries (status for January 1, 2019) 
(UNOSA, 2019, p. 10). The Treaty regulates a wide range 
of space exploration issues, i.a., it prohibits any kind of 
“appropriation” of space by national-states, which refers to 
the Moon and other celestial bodies (Art. II.), and obliges 
States Parties of the Treaty to open to representatives of 
other Parties of the Treaty all stations, installations, equip-
ment, and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies (Art. XII.). Apart from the direct prohibition of nu-
clear and mass destruction weapons in space, the Treaty 
does not regulate other issues related to the potential mili-
tarization of space. The document is a backbone of interna-
tional space law. Since this Treaty is quite short and gen-
eral, it was later supplemented by four formal agreements, 
namely: 1) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, April 22, 1968 (UNOSA, 1968), 2) Con-
vention on International Liability for Damage Caused by 
Space Objects, March 29, 1972 (UNOSA, 1972), 3) Con-
vention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, January 14, 1975 (UNOSA, 1975), 4) Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, December 18, 1979 (UNOSA, 1979). All 
the five documents constitute the legal framework of us-
ing outer space, although it has to be noted that the last 
of the listed documents has not been ratified by any state 
with the current of planned potential of launching humans 
into space, i.e., United States, Russia, China, Japan, and 
the majority of the member states of the European Space 
Agency (UNOSA, 2019, pp. 5-10).
The Treaty so far has relatively well served its purpose, 
i.e. there have been no severe cases of violation of its pro-
visions. From this perspective, the most controversial is the 
postulate to use outer space only for peaceful purposes 
(Art. IV.), e.g., in the context of orbiting spy satellites, which 
exact number, for obvious reasons, is unknown (however, 
as it was mentioned above, about 95% of satellites may be 
used for military purposes), or shooting down by China one 
of their own weather satellites with a medium-range ground-
to-air missile in 2007.
Due to the growing development of space technolo-
gies, as well as the recently observed increased frequency 
of space launches, i.a., thanks to commercial companies 
such as SpaceX or Blue Origin, there are more and more 
doubts regarding the validity of the current law, especially in 
the context of the further development and expansion. The 
two most important international legal challenges, which, as 
it seems, will require preparation and consensus are militari-
zation and commercialization of outer space.
The declarations of the leaders of the most important 
states on the space market, i.e., the United States, Russia, 
China, and India, indicate planned activities that directly or 
indirectly break the letter, if not the spirit of the Outer Space 
and the SALT II Treaties. In 2018, the United States Presi-
dent Donald J. Trump declared the establishment of Space 
Forces (Insinna, 2019). In 2019 India decided to set up a mil-
itary space agency – Space Defense Agency (Lele, 2019), 
Russian Space Forces, in their current, were created in 2015 
(GSO, 2019), and in the same year, China established their 
Strategic Support Force, which includes the Space Systems 
Department (Keck, 2014).
From the Treaty perspective, the problem of potential 
commercialization of space refers to Article II that reads:
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means (UNOSA, 1967).
According to the arguments provided in the 2015 US 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (GPO, 
2015), the Treaty treats national states as parties, not private 
entities. In consequence, such an interpretation of the law 
leads to the consent for private, commercial exploitation of, 
e.g., the objects of the main asteroid belt (so-called space 
mining), which, of course, met with negative reception from 
other countries like Russia.
From the perspective of the militarization of space, the 
most important is Article IV of the Treaty, according to which:
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States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place 
in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nucle-
ar weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, 
or station such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner (…) (UNOSA, 1967).
Currently, the dominant interpretations of this article ar-
gue that the placement of conventional weapons, including 
systems with nuclear drives, in orbit does not violate the pro-
visions of the Treaty (Bourbonniere & Lee, 2008). The Trea-
ty, according to these elucidations, does not also prohibit nu-
clear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on trajectory 
passing through space, as it is the case with the Russian 
ballistic missile RS-28 Sarmat. However, it prohibits placing 
and keeping biological, bacteriological, chemical, and nucle-
ar weapons in orbit (Boothby, 2017).
Of course, there are also other interpretations, according 
to which the Treaty has been infringed more than once. They 
are based on the quite right belief that in the case of modern 
weapons, one should talk about systems rather than a single 
ballistic missile. After all, the satellite navigation system was 
created as part of a ballistic missile guidance system with 
thermonuclear warheads (LaGrone, 2014). Therefore, we 
are dealing here with a very important philosophical and legal 
question whether the satellite being a part of such a system 
is a weapon and hence prohibited by the Treaty. This brings 
us back to the difficulty of clear and sound definition of the 
term “space weapon” addressed before. Does the fact that 
a civil communication satellite can be used (and often is) for 
military purposes make it a part of a weapon system? If so, 
what would be the consequences, especially if we took into 
consideration the fact that approximately 95% of satellites 
could be used that way? These questions, although theoret-
ical in nature, bear significant consequences for the binding 
power of the Treaty, and therefore the whole outer space 
legal framework. 
So far, however, the Treaty has been fulfilling its task 
quite well, and its provisions have been relatively seldom 
broken or violated. On the other hand, we are currently 
witnessing an undoubted renaissance of the space sec-
tor, which also applies to offensive and defensive military 
technologies and programs. The structure of the sector has 
changed as well – the twentieth-century traditional bipolar 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion is long gone. New entities have appeared in the game, 
both, private companies, such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, Vir-
gin Galactic and Virgin Orbit, Bigelow Aerospace, Rocket 
Lab, and national agencies – Indian ISRO (Indian Space 
Research Organization) or Chinese CNSA (China National 
Space Administration), which joined the key global actors 
like American NASA, Russian Roscosmos, European ESA, 
or Japanese JAXA. The record of orbital launches – 139, 
was set in 1967 (Kyle, 2019a). It may seem surprising that 
humanity has not been able to break this record for over 
50 years. However, since the middle of the first decade of 
the 21st century, we have been observing a steady increase 
in the number of orbital launches (52 in 2005, 70 in 2010, 
114 in 2018), and it seems that this record will be broken 
in 2019 because 173 starts are planned (Kyle, 2019b). The 
space sector is also growing as a market. It is estimated 
that it is currently worth about USD 350 billion, and accord-
ing to various consulting companies, it should reach a value 
of between USD 1 and 2.7 trillion in 2040 (Foust, 2018).
The change in the sector means that the existing solu-
tions, including the Space Treaty, are losing their signifi-
cance (e.g., space mining cannot be reconciled with Arti-
cle II of the Treaty), and the current geopolitical situation 
seems to exclude new, more adequate agreement that 
would be adapted to modern technologies. This situation, 
in turn, translates into more and more bolder violations of 
the existing laws, e.g., the already mentioned SPACE Act 
of 2015 or increasingly explicit orbital or suborbital weapons 
systems, which are clearly not developed “in the interest of 
maintaining international peace and security and promoting 
international co-operation and understanding” as it is stated 
in the Art. III of the Outer Space Treaty (UNOSA, 1967), as, 
e.g., the programs of Prompt Global Strike (CRS, 2019).
3. Outer Space as a Theatre for Potential Conflict
The progressive development of the space sector brings 
forth, as a natural consequence, the growth of its strategic 
importance. Every year we launch more and more satellites 
into the orbit. They are part of communication, navigation, 
reconnaissance, or security systems, which are used more 
and more and play an increasingly important role in the 
economy and security. Among many examples, one may 
point to the already mentioned Prompt Global Strike guid-
ance system, the European Galileo navigation system, or 
Starlink - a constellation of satellites, which is expected to 
provide broadband internet for the entire globe and con-
sist of approximately 42,000 satellites (SpaceX has already 
obtained a permission to launch 12,000 satellites, and in 
October 2019 the company asked the International Tele-
communication Union to arrange spectrum for 30,000 new 
ones) (Henry, 2019).
On the other hand, there is a growing threat of the 
democratization of weapons capable of destroying satellite 
systems. According to the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assess-
ment of the US Intelligence Community describes the space 
threat as one of the most significant ones (Coats, 2018, 
p. 13). ASAT The anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) are cur-
rently in possession of four countries – the United States, 
Russia, China, and, more recently, India. However, it is re-
ported that other nation-states have the potential to develop 
direct-ascent (DA) ASAT systems on the basis of their bal-
listic missiles, e.g., Iran and North Korea (Weeden, Sam-
son, 2019, pp. 4.1-2, 5.1-2), and some believe that Israel’s 
Arrow 3 missile has been developed to gain such a capabil-
ity (Opall-Rome, 2009). There are many indications that this 
technology will eventually also be available to traditionally 
weak actors who will acquire it through purchase or by de-
veloping their own systems. As it was already mentioned, 
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the space sector is growing by leaps and bounds. Nation-
al-states and private entities that did not invest much or at all 
in the space industry before are now developing launching 
technologies (e.g., New Zealand, Norway, Poland), what, 
as a consequence, must lead to the democratization of the 
technology. What is more, in addition to traditional ground-
space or air-space ASAT missiles, new types of that kind of 
weapon can be developed (potentially it could also become 
available for traditionally weak actors), such as small ka-
mikaze satellites1, cyber-hacking involving redirecting the 
object to a cloud of cosmic debris leading to its destruction 
or a weapon system that would be capable of “blinding” the 
satellite or destroy its sensors without physically destroying 
the object.
Considering the above facts, it should not come as 
a surprise that in order to ensure the operability of increas-
ingly important, also for national security, satellite systems, 
there are programs being implemented to create offensive 
and defensive systems for objects in orbit. And that, in 
turn, has generated the construction of countermeasures 
– weapons that would be able to neutralize the new sys-
tems – by the potential adversaries. As a consequence, we 
are witnessing an expansion of the potential conflict are-
na where outer space becomes a possible theatre for mil-
itary operations. This process is still in its early stages, but 
there should be no doubts that it is taking place already. 
Countries with sufficient technological potential caring for 
their current and future interests have been developing and 
will continue working on defensive systems (also aimed at 
eliminating the threat from traditionally weak actors) and 
offensive systems (ensuring military superiority and deter-
rence factor). Space corps are established and developed 
for exactly these purposes.
There is no indication that this process will stop. On the 
contrary, it seems that due to the progressive development 
of space technologies and the privatization of the sector, 
as well as substantial potential revenues from space min-
ing or the global satellite broadband internet system, it will 
accelerate. As it was demonstrated in the section dedicat-
ed to the legal framework of operating in outer space, the 
current laws and treaties have lost their significance, and 
they are not taken into account while planning future oper-
ations. The United Nations and its Office for Outer Space 
Affairs (UNOOSA) are structurally and legally too weak to 
inflict punishment or sanction for breaking the rules. One 
may then risk the claim that further militarization of space is 
inevitable. It will undoubtedly further affect the validity of the 
Outer Space Treaty, which, over time, will not be respected 
at all. That, in turn, will open the door to the development of 
various kinds of space offensive weapon systems.
1 The fact of launching into orbit four unregistered satellites by the Indian 
PSLV rocket on January 12, 2018, is worth mentioning here. These satel-
lites belonged to the American company Swarm Technologies, which had 
not received permission to launch them due to their small size and inability 
to monitor them in space (Christensen, 2018). This situation, of course, did 
not have a negative impact on global security but showed that the placing of 
“undefined” objects in orbit is possible even in today’s reality, where there is 
still a relatively small number of orbital launches.
4. Militarization of Outer Space Is Imminent
The main argument of the paper provides the information 
why there will be a progressive increase of weapon systems 
placed in orbit, and various types of space corps will be fur-
ther developed by national-states. 
As was demonstrated above, we, as humankind, rely 
more and more on orbital communication, navigation, and 
security systems. Global and regional navigation satellite 
systems are continually developed and perfected by a pro-
gressive number of entities, mainly national states. Examples 
of GNSS include Europe’s Galileo, the US’s NAVSTAR Glob-
al Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s Global’naya Navigat-
sionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS) and China’s 
BeiDou Navigation Satellite System. There are, however, 
another two regional systems under development, i.e., Indian 
Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) and Japanese 
Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). All of those satellites, 
apart from securing civil safety (e.g., in transportation, logis-
tics, communication), play a crucial role in national security.
Another example is the mentioned already Starlink sys-
tem that will provide broadband internet for the Northern US 
and parts of Canada already in 2020, and the plan is to cre-
ate the global system before 2027 (Mosher, 2019). Again, 
the system, although designed for civil purposes, will be used 
by the military – the US Air Force is testing SpaceX’s Starlink 
technology in military aircraft to deliver high bandwidth into 
the cockpit of Air Force planes under a program called Global 
Lightning (Malik, 2019). The facts are straightforward – there 
are more and more satellite systems that play an essential 
role in countries’ security and are part of critical infrastruc-
ture, so in order to secure their interests and protect that 
infrastructure, these national states keep developing both 
defensive and offensive means. The Worldwide Threat As-
sessment of the US Intelligence Community is very clear in 
its predictions in this regard:
We assess that, if a future conflict were to occur in-
volving Russia or China, either country would justify 
attacks against US and allied satellites as necessary 
to offset any perceived US military advantage de-
rived from military, civil, or commercial space systems 
(Coats, 2018).
However, we must not forget about the democratization 
of the weapon systems that may pose a serious and real 
threat to satellite systems. Currently, there are four countries 
in possession of the ASAT weapons that could destroy a sat-
ellite in orbit. However, more and more entities, both nation-
al states and private companies have been working on their 
launch technologies, like New Zeeland, Norway, Poland, 
just to name a few. Moreover, it should be remembered that 
not only ASAT missile systems may be used to attack and 
destroy satellites – one may use small kamikaze satellites 
to crash into the target, cyber-hacking to direct the object 
into the cloud of space debris, “blinding” the satellites with 
ground-based lasers (Mizokami, 2019). These technologies 
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are much more reachable. Therefore, in time, we should ex-
pect that traditionally weak actors, like rogue states or ter-
rorist organizations, will gain have access to them (Bernat, 
Posłuszna, 2018). 
5. Conclusions
We are witnesses to a new arms race that has been expand-
ed by the space technologies and weapon systems. It is not 
bipolar as it was the case in the 20th century – there are more 
players involved – there are US, Russia, and China in the 
leader group followed by increasingly developing India, and 
there is Europe with its European Space Agency that has 
to decide whether it should develop their own space forces. 
It seems no likely due to the lack of a joint European army 
and common command center (as well as Brexit – the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union). What is more proba-
ble is creating of space forces by particular European states, 
e.g., in July 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron an-
nounced that he had approved the creation of a space com-
mand within the French air force to improve the country’s 
defense capabilities (Weitering, 2019).
Due to the development of space technologies, their 
democratization, there are more and more objects in orbit 
that serve various purposes, including maybe the most im-
portant one – national security. The growth of the strategic 
importance of satellites, which have become part of critical 
infrastructure for many countries, has generated the devel-
opment of defensive and offensive measures to secure the 
safety (and hence the interests) of these countries. As a con-
sequence, we have ended up with outer space being treated 
more and more as a theatre for potential conflict. Old legal 
obstacles to weaponize space are not really in force anymore 
and will not limit the ambitions of the leading players to mili-
tarize the orbit further.
The most technologically advanced states in this area will 
keep securing their interests, both military and commercial, 
in space and thus develop defensive means (also designed 
to eliminate the threat posed by traditionally weak actors) 
and offensive weapons to secure military dominance and de-
ter potential adversaries. Space forces are necessary in this 
context to coordinate, plan, and command all these activities. 
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